

**Tropes of fear and the crisis of the west: Trumpism as a discourse of post-territorial
Coloniality.**

Gül Çalışkan and Kayla Preston

Routledge

Online ISSN: 1368-8790

DOI: 10.1080/13688790.2017.1376367

Publisher: Taylor and Francis Group

NOTICE: This is the accepted manuscript (after peer review) of the following article:

Çalışkan, Gül and Kayla Preston. (2017) “Tropes of fear and the crisis of the West: Trumpism as a discourse of post-territorial coloniality.” *Postcolonial Studies*. 20 (2): 199–216.

Published in final form at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2017.1376367>



Tropes of fear and the crisis of the west: Trumpism as a discourse of post-territorial coloniality

Gül Çalışkan & Kayla Preston

To cite this article: Gül Çalışkan & Kayla Preston (2017) Tropes of fear and the crisis of the west: Trumpism as a discourse of post-territorial coloniality, *Postcolonial Studies*, 20:2, 199-216, DOI: [10.1080/13688790.2017.1376367](https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2017.1376367)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13688790.2017.1376367>



Published online: 17 Sep 2017.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 1436



View related articles [↗](#)




View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 4 View citing articles [↗](#)



Tropes of fear and the crisis of the west: Trumpism as a discourse of post-territorial coloniality*

Gül Çalıřkan  and Kayla Preston

Department of Sociology, St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada

ABSTRACT

We examine ‘Trumpism’ as a contemporary form of colonial domination, showing how this discourse represents both a crisis of coloniality and a stimulus for a movement of ‘decoloniality’. A critical discourse analysis is applied to seven speeches delivered by Donald Trump between his announcement of his presidential candidacy in June 2015 and his inauguration in January 2017. In assessing Trump’s arguments, we focus mainly on those concerning national security, illegal immigration, and the threats posed by various foreign countries. Although these arguments sit within a long colonial tradition, they also indicate a crisis of modernity, as witnessed in the growing challenges to colonial masculinity, nationalism, and rationality. We conclude that Trumpism articulates a reaction to these challenges, and that Trump’s rise to power is a symptom of the crisis of post-territorial coloniality in contemporary global society.

KEYWORDS

Trumpism; decoloniality; politics of fear and hatred; colonial masculinity; post-territorial coloniality

Introduction

By ‘Trumpism’, we refer to the political ideas and sentiments of the 45th president of the United States, Donald J. Trump. This set of views and sentiments involves a forceful expression of American interests, which often involve ‘controversial or outrageous’ assertions of ethnocentric values.¹ The worldview expressed in Trumpism is not new. Rather, it is deeply rooted in Western imperial tradition. Modernism inherently incorporates the values of a dominator system,² in which progress, rationality, and scientific objectivity serve the fundamental quest for advantage, control, and supremacy over other lives. We argue that Trumpism is the latest articulation of this dominator system, which has its roots in the earlier politics of colonialism. As in the past, this ideology affirms a form of domination through the extension of sovereign power as further perpetuated through colonialism. We understand colonialism as an imperial project, which involves the extension of authority over another place or people through various forms of territorial occupation.

The colonialist worldview reflects the relationships between colonisers and colonised subjects. Trumpism shows the persistence of these relationships in the present, as they

CONTACT Gül Çalıřkan  gul@stu.ca

*The phrase ‘post-territorial coloniality’ was coined by one of the anonymous reviewers of this article. This is an important concept by which we frame contemporary coloniality as a means to analyse Trumpism.

© 2017 The Institute of Postcolonial Studies

draw upon ‘deeply held fantasies, strong emotions and intense belief systems’.³ This agenda is part of the system of oppression that has operated within Western society for centuries and throughout the world since the advent of colonisation.

In this article, we identify the thread of colonial thinking running through Western colonial history, which connects its advocates from Balfour to Trump. Postcolonial scholarship sheds light on how the systematic tools of the oppressors have developed over generations. Western societies have been built with such tools as othering, and numerous politicians have explicitly capitalised on them. The harm done in the use of such tactics is growing ever more evident as more people are increasingly disadvantaged.

However, there has always been a cultural counterforce to dominator values, namely, the values of partnership and mutual support, as commonly found among local communities, women, and social movements for equality.⁴ Today, the rise of decoloniality shows that it is still possible to prioritise partnership values and to make the quality of mutual relations our central concern.

Conceptual framework

Post-territorial coloniality

The traditional form of colonialism ended with the great anti-colonial independence movements of the twentieth century. Even so, the West continues to hold much political, military, and economic control over previously colonised countries. Colonial power structures live on under a different constellation of forces, with different social, economic, and emotional effects. Both in the West and globally, the tools of oppression created during earlier colonial times – notably the concepts of ethnicity and race – still act as powerful signifiers of social hierarchies.⁵ We understand Western coloniality as relying on a ‘worldview that believes in the absolute superiority of the West over the Rest, of polarized discourses’.⁶ In this division of the world, a polarity is presumed between civilised and uncivilised, developed and undeveloped, rational and irrational. The postcolonial extensions of the worldview we analyse here has its basis in earlier forms of colonisation. Coloniality highlights the beliefs and attitudes expressed during colonial times, as well as their imminent conjunction, combination, and continuation in the postcolonial and post-territorial era. We understand the contemporary form of coloniality as part of the ongoing ‘postcolonial discourse’. In other words, our use of the term ‘coloniality’ refers to both the earlier period of intense global colonisation of the South, which is classically defined as ‘colonial times’, and its more contemporary forms of post-territorial colonisation. The forms of territory and their occupation have multiplied and diversified along with the practices of governance under contemporary globalisation. To capture the difference between the territories colonised during ‘colonial times’ and those subject to contemporary occupations of places and peoples in contemporary coloniality (and to characterise the contemporary mode of post-formal colonisation), we refer to ‘postcolonial coloniality’ or ‘post-territorial coloniality’.

As Edward Said⁷ wrote, ‘Imperialism did not end, did not suddenly become “past”, once decolonisation had set in motion the dismantling of the classical empires’. Instead, the systems of coloniality have remained embedded in the fabric of Western society. Although these systems of domination may lie dormant, they continue to underpin Western

institutions. The fear, hatred, and anger that Trump expresses towards those he sees as Other have long been expressed by both political leaders and academics. The speeches of British Prime Minister Arthur Balfour (July 1902–December 1905), the writings of the First Earl of Cromer (the consul-general in Egypt, 1883–1907), and the arguments made by more recent scholars such as Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington all show patterns of thinking that are clearly evident in Trump's speeches. These speeches reveal Trump's reliance on colonial language. The popular appeal of such language shows that much of U.S. society remains committed to coloniality. However, Trumpism also exhibits post-territorial colonialism in crisis as the colonial project faces new and unexpected challenges.

The Other: modernity, knowledge, power

Modernity, as an assemblage of socio-cultural norms, attitudes, and practices, has developed since the post-medieval era in Europe. This assemblage involves a range of inter-related historical processes and cultural phenomena, along with their ongoing effects on cultures and institutions.⁸ Modernity was forged on the back of colonial relations.⁹ Those relations of command and control served to bring a particular system for the production of knowledge into being, namely analytic, codified knowledge. In its control of representation, the Western modernising enterprise has treated knowledge as a means of gaining colonial power.¹⁰ This kind of knowledge has been framed in colonial terms to separate and codify peoples. The backbone of modern knowledge therefore reflects its origins in European imperial ambitions.¹¹

Modern knowledge has been presented as 'the temple of Logic', with an assumption that Oriental civilisations are devoid of such enterprise. As the Earl of Cromer explained in the early twentieth century, 'Even the Englishman, therefore, is constrained – sometimes much against his will – to bow down in that temple of Logic, the existence of which the Oriental is disposed altogether to ignore.'¹²

If the Western subject embodies rationality, and if Western thought is the definition of logic, then a set of power relations is created in which only persons of a certain social identity are considered rational beings.¹³ Western subjectivity therefore functions within a social divide: knowledge produced by the Western subject is verified as objective knowledge.

Methodology: critical discourse analysis (CDA)

We analyse seven speeches delivered by Trump between June 2015 and January 2017: (a) the announcement of his presidential candidacy (June 2015); (b) a speech on the stakes involved in the election (June 2016); (c) a general campaign speech (June 2016); (d) a speech on immigration (August 2016), (e) one on terrorism (August 2016), (f) one on national security (September 2016); and (g) his inauguration speech (January 2017). Using CDA as a guide, we can begin to understand the relevance of the postcolonial discourse in Trump's 'post-truth' era. Our study touches on themes often explored in CDA, such as the theme of dominance,¹⁴ the context of discourse,¹⁵ and the constructed nature of reality.¹⁶

In our basic critique of the analytical codification of modern knowledge, we apply CDA, a methodological tool stemming from the very modern knowledge formation that it

critiques. As we are not dismissive of this knowledge, and as political claims cannot be so generalised, we note that this critique, using CDA, allows us to engage in such analysis as an act of transgression. Bhabha explains the importance of such transgressive actions.¹⁷ By using a tool of modern knowledge (such as CDA) to critique modernity, we too are engaging in a transgressive action. We are turning modernity against itself, and by doing so we are creating a slippage of power that enables the possibility of our own critique of post-colonial discourses.¹⁸

In conducting CDA, we also position ourselves within a particular framework in defining discourse. According to Schiffrin, discourse is ‘a particular unit of language or a particular focus on language use’.¹⁹ This definition reflects two distinct paradigms for defining discourse: with one perspective emphasising its structure (e.g. grammar, sentence structure), and the other emphasising its intended communicative function. In this article, the focus is on the communicative functions of discourse, which the messengers either intend or unknowingly seek to achieve. Discourse both constitutes the social world and is constituted by it. Discursive practices are essential components in the constitution of social realities, including human identities and relations. As a social practice, discourse exists in a dialectical relationship with other social forces, including political and educational institutions. Discourse does not just reflect the social forces around us, but helps to shape them as well.²⁰

CDA focuses on how power relations shape the practices of discourse, with discourse being broadly understood as communicative intent. Fairclough²¹ describes CDA as a three-dimensional framework for studying texts and talk, the practices of discourse (the ways that texts are produced, disseminated, and consumed), and the manner in which discursive events emerge as everyday practices.

While subscribing to the Foucauldian notion of power as a productive force that creates subjects and agents, CDA diverges from other forms of discourse analysis in the role that it ascribes to ideology as a medium for the marginalisation and dispossession of social groups.²² Foucault has a special place in CDA for two reasons. First, his conceptions of power and governmentality link with CDA’s commitment to identifying power positions and their relations. Second, Foucault’s extended notion of discourse (which includes texts, ways of organising knowledge, and worldviews) allows researchers to go beyond critiquing oral performances and written documents.

In brief, CDA evaluates how power relations are enacted, reproduced, and resisted through analysis of text and talk within the social context.²³ This makes CDA an ideal lens through which to examine the words and intentions of President Donald Trump.

Analysis: the rhetoric of Trumpism

Expressing fear of Muslims has become a standard device in Western rhetoric. Some media, far-right political figures, and rising populist movements are using tropes of fear to create a powerful image of the dangerous Other. Such discourse is fuelling a rise of unrestrained hatred, particularly in the United States and Europe. The language of fear creates its own structure. Phrases like ‘Muslim terrorists’ or ‘banning Muslims from entering the U.S.’ add embellishments to the more generalised biases of extreme-right politics everywhere.²⁴ Matsuda²⁵ writes of the ‘deadly violence that accompanies the persistent verbal degradation of those subordinated Racist hate messages, threats, slurs, epithets,

and disparagement all hit the gut of those in the target group'. The politics of fear and hatred has its greatest impact on the lives of the people it targets as dangers to society.

Trumpism mobilises the rhetoric of hatred and fear. Butler²⁶ explains that 'A social structure is enunciated at the moment of the hateful utterance; hate speech reinvokes the position of dominance, and reconsolidates it.' Trumpism is a 'linguistic rearticulation of social domination'; a 'site for the mechanical and predictable reproduction of power'.²⁷ As a subject who speaks hatred, Trump is clearly responsible for his words. However, he is not 'the *originator* of that speech' (emphasis added): his speech of hatred and fear 'works through the invocation of convention',²⁸ and the convention invoked is coloniality. Thus, the rhetoric of Trumpism neither begins nor ends with Trump.

Crisis of colonial masculinity

Trump's rhetoric echoes that of earlier spokesmen for ethnic supremacy from the age of colonial empires:

We know the civilization of Egypt better than we know the civilization of any other country. We know it further back; we know it more intimately; we know more about it.²⁹

Even the Central African savage may eventually learn to chant a hymn in honour of *Astraea Redux*, as represented by the British official who denies him gin but gives him justice.³⁰

In the classical Islamic view, to which many Muslims are beginning to return, the world and all mankind are divided into two: the House of Islam, where the Muslim law and faith prevail, and the rest, known as the house of Unbelief or the House of War, which it is the duty of Muslims ultimately to bring to Islam.³¹

The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy.³²

Bhabha³³ suggests that the perception of otherness is achieved through a paradoxical strategy. On the one hand, colonised subjects are said to be essentially 'other'. The labelling suggests an unchanging order and rigidity of human relations – as not admitting the possibility of change or differentiation among others. On the other hand, the construction of the Other as something clearly identifiable needs to be constantly repeated. The repetition, however, implies that the construction of the Other cannot be established once and for all – the characterisation comes undone if it is not constantly reiterated. Repetition thus promotes but also endangers the stereotype. Still, colonial discourse appears to show little ambivalence: colonial discourse creates the colonised as a social reality, and, from the perspective of the coloniser, it seems to work smoothly indeed.

The colonised human being is constructed as the Other through the discourse of the coloniser, whose aim is control. The colonised Other is deemed to be 'entirely knowable and visible'.³⁴ Bhabha explains that the coloniser intends to control the colonised by finding out everything about them (recall Balfour's boast, we know Egypt 'intimately'), and using that knowledge to define the colonised in a negative way. Power is a strategy whereby what is known about the colonised is used to construct an identity defined by fundamental difference. Emphasising difference, 'European discourses ... constitute "the Orient" as a unified racial, geographical, political and cultural zone of the world'.³⁵

Throughout colonial history, creating the Other has been a primary task for politicians. This gives the othering process the sheen of legitimacy; it is also a necessary means to an end. In addition, academics create binary opposites whenever they ‘other’ different populations, as we have seen in the words of Lewis and Huntington.

According to Said,³⁶ the systematic creation of the distant enemy is inherent in the colonial enterprise. The fabrication of the Other is not inevitable, but rather is deliberately chosen to fulfil political agendas. Othering serves to subject the colonised to the desires of the coloniser. As the West has trod to the path to modernity, enlightenment, and world conquest, it has always done so on the backs of those it has constructed as Other. Used to justify oppression, invasion, war, and genocide, othering has served as a means of obtaining the seemingly unobtainable and at the same time gaining the public support needed to pursue discriminatory goals.³⁷ The quotations above illustrate the rhetoric by which particular groups are cast out and redefined so that their members are no longer seen as human beings. Viewed as objects, they can be ignored or controlled; so different from Westerners, they deserve no sympathy.

Similarly, Donald Trump manufactures negative attributes for a range of populations, including Mexicans, Chinese, Arabs, and immigrants:

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best ... They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with them. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.³⁸

Throughout his campaign, Trump constantly dehumanised those he deemed Other. His comments reinforced the social hierarchy established by white Westerners.³⁹ By using language that emphasised illegality, laziness, and danger, he solidified the boundaries between the West and the Other first created through colonisation. Without offering any proof, Trump makes broad statements that frame entire populations through an ethnocentric view. He redefines people – here, Mexicans – as people to be feared (‘they’re rapists’).

We will use the best technology, including above- and below-ground sensors, towers, aerial surveillance and manpower to supplement the wall, find and dislocate tunnels, and keep out the criminal cartels, and Mexico will pay for the wall.⁴⁰

Fanon⁴¹ wrote that the coloniser never feels inferior, even when living in the lands of those he others. When Trump stated that he was going to build a wall between the land claimed by the United States and that of Mexico, and when he insisted that Mexico would pay for it, he was drawing on the superiority that Fanon observed. Trump was literally and metaphorically recreating colonial space: by treating the people who have lived on that land for centuries as if they were pollutants, Trump was remaking coloniality.

Hey, I’m not saying they’re stupid. I like China ... I just sold an apartment for \$15 million to somebody from China. Am I supposed to dislike them? I own a big chunk of the Bank of America Building at 1290 Avenue of the Americas, that I got from China in a war. Very valuable.⁴²

Trumpism also operates through ‘knowing’. Trump lays claim to superior knowledge; only he truly knows China, for instance. Grosfoguel⁴³ notes that the coloniser presumes to produce real knowledge about the Other; real knowledge, Western knowledge – the only valuable form. Anyone who operates outside Western subjectivity must prove that

their knowledge has validity through reference to the knowledge produced by the West. Thus, knowledge production itself is a tool of othering and form of coloniality.⁴⁴ In Trump, however, we observe a shift towards a yet more reactionary type of fact-claiming. A Western businessman with intimate knowledge of China, Trump presents himself as astute for recognising that the Chinese are not stupid. He feels qualified to assess the capabilities of an entire people from his superior vantage point. Throughout colonial history, Westerners have presumed intellectual superiority. When Trump says ‘I’m not saying they’re stupid’, he trivialises the Chinese while playfully acknowledging that he can state whatever he wants to about them, because they are objects to be defined by men like himself.

As Whitehead⁴⁵ writes, the leading characteristic of a political leader is heteronormative masculinity, and the discourse of coloniality has long been the speech of manhood. The coloniser is characteristically masculine. Metaphors of conflict, aggression, and war describe politics in general, colonial politics in particular. With Trumpism, these metaphors become boldly embodied by the capitalist subject, who now openly asserts his privilege:

We used to have victories, but we don’t have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let’s say, China in a trade deal? They kill us. I beat China all the time. All the time.⁴⁶

As Said⁴⁷ argues, when colonisers write about the Orient, they do so for their own self-interests, using their presumption of domination and superiority as focal points of ethnocentric judgement. Similarly, Trump boasts that he ‘beat[s] China all the time’, casting himself as more powerful than the entire Chinese nation. Such ethnocentric masculinity illustrates how the Western male subject has historically thought about the world.⁴⁸ The most characteristic expression of this esteem for muscular domination is ethnocentrism. However, when Trump claims that he and his nation can beat, outsmart, or overpower an entire country, the ethnocentrism of the Western world is exposed. Such colonial masculinity articulates itself as disdain for others. As a Western man born to great wealth, Trump has always been in a position of power. In the past, his arrogance seemed to serve him well, allowing him to use business associates as tools for his own ends, and to view less successful people as losers (‘you’re fired’). In such men, the assertion of superiority has typically involved ethnocentrism to the point of dehumanising the people of other cultures.⁴⁹ In this sense, ‘Whiteness is a form of property, but a prosthetic form. The transcendence of corporeal whiteness has been shown to be a hyper-masculine, white supremacist project.’⁵⁰

As Moore⁵¹ explains,

Colonial manhood was violent, racist and sexist ... There were separate gender spheres; and a quite clear concept of a subaltern ‘other’ ... [Colonial manhood] was constructed against the image of multiple others: women; recent immigrant males; non-Caucasian males; and limits of the expression of homosocial and homoerotic behaviour.

As in colonial manhood, Trumpism presumes that masculinity must involve dominance. As Kiesling⁵² puts it, ‘Dominance is the identification of masculinity with dominance, authority, or power; to be a man is to be strong, authoritative, and in control, especially when compared to women, and also when compared to other men.’

At the same time, ISIS is trying to infiltrate refugee flows into Europe and the US.⁵³

We also have to be honest about the fact that not everyone who seeks to join our country will be able to successfully assimilate. It is our right as a sovereign nation to choose immigrants that we think are the likeliest to thrive and flourish here.⁵⁴

These two statements by Trump highlight the use of the immigrant as a means of othering. Trump views people from different regions as others to be feared and as groups able to be defined by a set of essential characteristics. When Trump makes broad statements about immigration, he defines the migrant as having inherent qualities, an essential nature. Here essentialism, another useful colonial tool, justifies treating people according to their presumably shared characteristics.⁵⁵ Essentialism also positions the creator of the label as superior, precisely because of his ability to pass such judgements, which might otherwise be taken as prejudiced and simplistic generalisations. In creating definitions of other people, the colonising mind is able to determine fixed expectations for others within an essential frame.⁵⁶

Thus, Trump is able to apply a single definition of the immigrant to generate fear and anger towards all immigrants, but especially those from the Middle East. By broadly treating Middle Eastern migrants as inclined to intolerance and terrorism, he makes it seem obvious that many of these distant others will be incapable of assimilating in American society. He thereby recreates the same definitions of others that were used as instruments of colonisation⁵⁷:

Each year, the United States permanently admits more than 100,000 immigrants from the Middle East, and many more from Muslim countries outside the Middle East. Our government has been admitting ever-growing numbers, year after year, *without any effective plan for our security*.⁵⁸ (emphasis added)

Trump has repeatedly encouraged U.S. citizens to regard the Muslim Other as a potential enemy. This characterisation strikes a chord with many listeners who have inherited the traditional Western attitude towards the East.⁵⁹ By positioning Middle Eastern people as inherently dangerous, the West has long been able to justify an assumption of superiority towards them.⁶⁰ Trump adopts this discourse when speaking about Muslim immigrants as aliens to be feared, excluded, placed under special restrictions, or even treated with naked hostility:

All those Iraqi kids who've been blown to pieces. And it turns out that all of the reasons for the war were blatantly wrong. All this for nothing ...

If we had controlled the oil, we could have prevented the rise of ISIS in Iraq – both by cutting off a major source of funding, and through the presence of U.S. forces necessary to safeguard the oil and other vital infrastructure.⁶¹

In these quotations, following the analysis of Bhabha,⁶² we see the ambivalence of post-colonial discourse about the Other. The ambivalence, however, betrays a certain slippage in the old colonial definitions. Because the colonial Other is a mental construction, it requires effort to maintain, especially as it is so often contradicted in real life. Trump displays this kind of slippage when he pronounces his judgements on Iraq. First, he says it was wrong for the United States to invade Iraq, but then he states that the United States should have stayed in Iraq to take over its resources, making two seemingly contradictory arguments in the same breath. This kind of critical reassertion of colonial ambitions is, inevitably, both inaccurate and transgressive. In addition, the slippage shows how Western neocolonial

discourse actually serves to create an imagined empire. It presumes an ongoing right and responsibility of the West to manage the East.

Of course, such discourses are inherently inaccurate, as even the people who create them have difficulty maintaining them. When Trump expresses such contradictory statements, he is actually undermining his own power, creating ambivalence towards the whole Western project.⁶³ As discussed later, through this slippage of the story line, the people who are being othered may gain power and recognition by manipulating the ideas in colonial discourse.⁶⁴ When Trump uses self-contradictory definitions of the Other in Iraq, he not only undermines his own processes of othering but illustrates how invalid this whole creation of the Other is.

Crisis of nationalism

We are in Egypt not merely for the sake of the Egyptians, though we are there for their sake; we are there also for the sake of Europe at large. If this be the task which, as it has been thrown upon us we ought to take up, as it is a task which, at all events to the best of our knowledge and belief, is of infinite benefit to the races with whom we deal, what are the special difficulties attaching to it? The difficulties are very great and inevitable.⁶⁵

But the Englishman is a Western, albeit an Anglo-Saxon Western, and, from the point of view of all processes of reasoning, the gulf which separates any one member of the European family from another is infinitely less wide than that which divides all Westerns from all Orientals.⁶⁶

Nor, of course, did the governments of the countries of origin of these Muslim spokesmen ever accord such protection to religions other than their own. In their perception, there is no contradiction in these attitudes. The true faith, based on God's final revelation, must be protected from insult and abuse; other faiths, being either false or incomplete, have no right to any such protection.⁶⁷

The West is now at an extraordinary peak of power in relation to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from the map. Military conflict among the Western states is unthinkable, and Western military power is unrivalled.⁶⁸

The crisis of nationalism has gone hand in hand with the crisis of whiteness in Western countries.⁶⁹ As white people in Western society are increasingly called on to renounce their domination of others, they have commonly lashed out in self-defence or insisted that they have no such position of privilege.⁷⁰ Clearly, as white colonists fabricated their claims to dominion over lands that were stolen in acts of genocide against First Nations peoples, it is objectively true that the United States has been built on the backs of subordinated or marginalised people.⁷¹ When asked to take ownership of this injustice, the inheritors of the theft commonly cry, 'This is my country.'⁷²

In response, empire-loyalist men such as Balfour, Cromer, Lewis, Huntington, and now Trump have repeatedly risen to defend and expand their people's transgressions against others. This crisis of nationalism has involved an ongoing struggle over the status of non-Western populations within Western empires. The great debate has divided Western societies over the generations, and involves a concern for both ethnic status and ethnic security. In 1961 James Baldwin observed, 'I am afraid that most of the white people I have ever known impressed me as being in the grip of a weird nostalgia, dreaming of a vanished state of security and order.'⁷³ As Trump puts it:

The U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody else's problems. Thank you. It's true, and these are the best and the finest.⁷⁴

Here Trump makes the crisis of nationalism explicit. He attempts to sow panic and indicates which enemy Americans should fear in the wake of the worldwide economic crisis. Trump's statement raises the question, 'Whose fault is it?' His answer seems to be, 'Everybody else's'. But who is Trump calling 'everybody else'? Who could have possibly created this 'dumping ground' that Trump claims the United States has become? Part of the answer may be found in Kumar's⁷⁵ analysis of Rudyard Kipling's poem 'The White Man's Burden', the premise of which is that it is the duty of Whites to civilise the 'lesser societies'. Writing in 1899, Kipling urged his fellow colonisers to:

Take up the White Man's burden –
 Send forth the best ye breed –
 Go bind your sons to exile
 To serve your captives' need;
 To wait in heavy harness,
 On fluttered folk and wild –
 Your new-caught, sullen peoples,
 Half-devil and half-child.⁷⁶

In colonial times, it was believed that the white man had a divinely appointed responsibility to 'serve' the peoples of other nations; Westerners had to accept the burden of the task, which had little or no reward.⁷⁷ Although this belief system – and Kipling's poem itself – inspired missions of religious evangelism and humanitarian aid, it also provided a moral imperative for further conquest of the non-Western world. The great powers seemed to have an ethical duty to invade and claim the resources of other countries.⁷⁸

The same system of belief is reinforced when Trump grandly blames other nations for creating the 'dumping ground' that the United States has become. America's present problems were created by the United States becoming too interdependent with the rest of the world: America's problems. Not only does he vilify 'other nations' as backward and problematic, his language also justifies past, present, and future colonial missions. Bringing such nations under American control would both deter evil and benefit people unfit to rule themselves:

We stopped believing in what America could do, and became reliant on other countries, other people, and other institutions. We lost our sense of purpose, and daring.⁷⁹

Here again we see blame being placed on the Other in the crisis of American nationalism. In discussing the sociologist Morroe Berger's statements about the lack of cultural production or political vitality in the Middle East, Edward Said⁸⁰ treats such arguments as examples of the colonisers' ignorance. Much like Berger seemed to do 50 years ago, Trump fails to recognise any cultural, political, or economic benefit that the United States may have gained from other countries. He blames 'globalism' for causing massive harm to the United States; he advocates that ties to other nations be reduced, not

strengthened. Again the Other is identified as the root of the problem for the United States. People who differ from Trump are scapegoated through this classification.

January 20th 2017, will be remembered as the day the people became the rulers of this nation again. The forgotten men and women of our country will be forgotten no longer. Everyone is listening to you now.⁸¹

This statement implies that the only victims of America's past policies are the 'forgotten men and women of our country'. Paradoxically, Trump claims that these forgotten people are his white supporters. Such a claim ignores the colonisation process and the people who have really been marginalised within American and Western society in order to prioritise white people, providing this segment of the population with its long-standing, unearned privilege. Dyer⁸² states that white privilege is all-encompassing, as the existing structures of society have been established through a bias in which all views are invalidated save the views of white people. From that perspective, the United States is seen as failing only when it fails white people. Indeed, in the past, the nation's failings towards people of different races have largely been considered successes.

Crisis of rationality: post-truth

But after 3,000, 4,000, or 5,000 years of known history, and unlimited centuries of unknown history have been passed by these nations under a different system, it is not thirty years of British rule which is going to alter the character bred into them by this immemorial tradition.⁸³

Englishmen are less imitative than most Europeans in this sense – that they are less disposed to apply the administrative and political systems of their own country to the government of backward populations.⁸⁴

At first the Muslim response to Western civilization was one of admiration and emulation – an immense respect for the achievements of the West, and a desire to imitate and adopt them. This desire arose from a keen and growing awareness of the weakness, poverty and backwardness of the Islamic world as compared with the advancing West.⁸⁵

The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.⁸⁶

In explaining the 'regime' of Truth, Foucault⁸⁷ argues that power is exerted through the processes by which things are defined as true. Knowledge in this sense is an instrument of power. Knowledge means more than an awareness of things that exist. Such awareness develops only through naming or defining things in certain ways. Thus only by giving a name to something does that something come into existence for us. Knowledge produces truth; both knowledge and truth are means of discursive power.

The past decade has witnessed the emergence of a new term: 'post-truth'. (Due to the remarkable spike in the use of this term, the Oxford Dictionary honoured *post-truth* as the Word of the Year for 2016.) 'Post-truth' is defined as 'relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief'.⁸⁸ The increase in the rhetoric of hate, fear, and anger in political life has contributed to the emergence of this concept, illustrating a crisis in who determines 'knowledge and power':

But I speak to border guards and they tell us what we're getting. And it only makes common sense. It only makes common sense. They're sending us not the right people.⁸⁹

These ten steps, if rigorously followed and enforced, will accomplish more in a matter of months than our politicians have accomplished on this issue in the last fifty years.⁹⁰

You came by the tens of millions to become part of a historic movement the likes of which the world has never seen before.⁹¹

In such manipulation of reality by the powerful, 'false truths' are repeated until they become the only definition of truth that the masses know. Then a shift in reality occurs. What is truth, and who makes it up? The system of rationality inspired by the Enlightenment is turned on its head.⁹² Rationality becomes a technology of self-validation, used by one life against other lives. The self to be validated must claim superior authority to define what is real, what is rational, and who is the enemy. As Fanon⁹³ explained, 'Hate demands existence and he who hates has to show his hate in appropriate actions and behaviour; in a sense, he has to become hate.' With the emergence of post-truth, we are witnessing the crisis caused by this rationality. Politicians such as Trump, Balfour, and Cromer had to become hate in order to fabricate notions of truth to fit their own ends. Hate is seen as appropriate if its cause and its target can be confirmed as truly contemptible. Thus, the Western subject engages in a manipulation of perceived truth as a political weapon.

Conclusion

Our conclusions mainly concern the ways in which we can understand, challenge, and resist the tropes of fear and hatred towards the Other that are prevalent in our times. The opportunities provided by CDA can help us to understand the postcolonial discourses of coloniality, and to realise the significance of decoloniality as a political orientation in forming solidarities and resistance.

Understanding postcolonial discursive practices

Krzyżanowski and Forchtner⁹⁴ argued that given the struggles of the twenty-first century, such as the struggles for democracy and economic justice, the practice of CDA must involve developing new approaches and theoretical underpinnings. In this article, we have underpinned CDA with postcolonial theory in order to address to some key issues raised by Trumpism: its re-creation of the Other, the crisis of colonial masculinity, the crisis of nationalism, and the post-truth society that is now appearing in the Western world.

As with most approaches to CDA, our analysis demonstrates that power is not an 'object' that is possessed and exerted over others but rather is a living force that *produces* social positions and subjectivities by its own initiative. By analysing how the discursive practices of Trumpism serve to construct or defend a certain kind of social reality (with its human identities, power relations, and social positions), we can discern how these practices operate as postcolonial discourses, serving the interests of particular social groups. This analysis of Trumpism draws attention to the key role of discourse in creating and reproducing unequal power relations between social groups. This discourse can be broadly understood as the expression of a traditional ideological agenda.⁹⁵

As noted by Jørgensen and Phillips,⁹⁶ CDA is dialectical rather than deterministic in relation to everyday discursive practices. Our analysis reveals that discursive practices contribute to the creation and reproduction of imbalanced power relations between people assigned to different social positions, such as the positions of immigrants and ‘the American people’. Foucault has helped us to identify the themes in Trump’s speeches. By treating these speeches as productions of discourse, inherently productive of power relations, we are able to disentangle some of the more important threads: the creation of the Other, the display of ethnocentric masculinity, the crisis of nationalism, and the narrative of the post-truth era.

This mode of discourse also presents new challenges. Now that social media is an important arena of public discourse, the need to fight against colonial discrimination is more urgent than ever. However, with that need comes opportunity, as those at the margins of society and those who are privileged both have new tools to combat the propaganda of hatred and fear. In the present climate we need to ask ourselves as citizens how we will fight against the colonial tools of oppression, as reiterated by current leaders of the ‘free world’.

As a methodology that is itself part of modern knowledge formation, CDA can be a transgressive activity for turning modernity against itself, creating a slippage of power that enables the possibility for our own critique of postcolonial discourse. CDA is more relevant than ever as the politics of hatred and fear – whether Trump’s or that of his various colonial antecedents – continues to afflict the global community. The use of CDA to examine Trumpism points the way towards decolonial resistance. CDA alerts us to the fact that language is a social practice: through intertwined systems of meanings, language constructs particular realities. By attending to the social context of discourse, CDA identifies broad, socially shared patterns of meaning. It brings into focus how social inequalities are created and perpetuated, but also how they can be resisted through discourse.

Decoloniality as a political orientation of resistance

The long stream of Western history conveys habits of the past, and dealing with those habits requires critical reflection. The orientation of decoloniality enables us to perceive the thread of colonial thinking running throughout this history, clearly connecting Balfour and Trump. After examining how the heritage of coloniality relates to Donald Trump, it is necessary to suggest a move towards a more inclusive political context. Perhaps, the most important social development of the current century is the rise of ‘decoloniality’.⁹⁷ We understand decoloniality as a response to all forms of political, social, and cultural domination, as witnessed especially in the contemporary rhetoric of fear, hatred, and anger towards Muslims. In response to such divisive rhetoric, decoloniality and ‘borderlands thinking’⁹⁸ illuminate a road to a more egalitarian society.

Decolonial ‘thinking and doing’⁹⁹ interrogates the histories of power that have emerged from colonial Europe.¹⁰⁰ This kind of discourse presents a clear challenge to modernity as it was understood in the past, with its presumptions of binary opposition between West and East. However, as both Mignolo¹⁰¹ and Quijano¹⁰² have noted, decoloniality is not a project that aims to impose itself as a new abstract universal idea. It is not a movement for ‘improving’ West/East binary thought. Rather, decoloniality is a third force – a ‘trans-border’ way of thinking and doing.¹⁰³

A decolonial epistemic shift ‘brings to the foreground other epistemologies, other principles of knowledge and understanding and, consequently, other economies, other politics, other ethics’.¹⁰⁴ Our examination of Trumpism is grounded in such a political orientation, and it involves a discussion that goes beyond postcolonial discourse.

The language of fear and hatred reflects the failure to understand the human experience of global society (including its travesties, such as the contemporary refugee crisis). A discursive trope of East/West interprets the world’s vast social diversity in terms of a confrontation between two opposing forces of West and East. The rise of fear and hatred reflects a crisis in which Western society is increasingly losing its political, social, and cultural domination over the previously colonised Others of the world.¹⁰⁵

Although the twenty-first century has marked a crisis of modernity and of coloniality, it has also, due to the thinking and action of many emerging social justice movements, witnessed the flourishing of ‘decoloniality’ as a political orientation. It is too early to predict how the current crisis will be resolved. Even so, we argue that the steps to overcoming social divisions can best be found in communities of struggle among the very people who are the targets of hostility. Their insights and actions go beyond the boundaries set by the logic of modernity.¹⁰⁶ Their decolonial thinking and doing show what steps are possible for overcoming historical divisions.

As Fanon¹⁰⁷ explained, ‘Every citizen of a nation is responsible for the actions committed in the name of that nation.’ It is time for Western society to take responsibility for the creation of the institutions that have produced political and academic discrimination, as exemplified in the election of Donald J. Trump. Decoloniality happens whenever communities of struggle call the narratives of modernity and coloniality into question. Decoloniality has a lot to offer towards this end. As the political orientation of our times, it provides us with ways of thinking and doing that unravel and resist acts of coloniality. As such, decoloniality is both an epistemological and a political project. It is a matter of thinking (epistemological disobedience) and doing (co-resistance). Resisting together with communities of struggle requires both epistemological and political commitment.

When speaking about the creation of the Other in society, Fanon¹⁰⁸ boldly suggested that ‘another solution is possible. It implies a restructuring of the world’. Although we can never turn back the effects of colonisation, we *can* restructure the narrative. By bringing those at the margins into the conversation and by recognising non-Western forms of knowledge, a new celebration of diversity and shared humanity can occur. As a society, we urgently need this kind of interactive discourse. This kind of sociality brings us to a particular form of political orientation, namely, decoloniality.

Notes

1. Cambridge Dictionary, ‘Trumpism’. n.d. Available at: <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/trumpism> (accessed 31 March 2017).
2. See Riane Eisler, *The Chalice & the Blade*, New York: HarperCollins, 1987; Brian Griffith, *The Gardens of Their Dreams: Desertification and Culture in World History*, London: Zed Books, 2001. Some of these ideas are from a personal exchange with Brian Griffith.
3. Arnal Treacher, ‘On Postcolonial Subjectivity’, *Group Analysis* 38(1), 2005, p 43.
4. As Riane Eisler argues, all of history is an ongoing struggle between the values of partnership and of domination, from the early ‘goddess cultures’ of Neolithic times, to the warlord or

- colonial empires of past centuries, to our global society with its highly polarised political visions.
5. Anibal Quijano, 'Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality', *Cultural Studies* 21(2–3), 2007, pp 168–178.
 6. Treacher, 'On Postcolonial Subjectivity', p 44.
 7. Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, London: Vintage Press, 1994, p 341.
 8. Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity*, London and Brooklyn: Verso, 2010.
 9. Quijano, 'Coloniality'.
 10. Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, New York: Pantheon Books, 1972; Walter D. Mignolo, 'Delinking: The Rhetoric of Modernity, the Logic of Coloniality and the Grammar of De-coloniality', *Cultural Studies* 21(2–3), 2007, pp 449–514.
 11. Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, New York: Grove Press, 1967; Deepa Kumar, *Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire*, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012; Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
 12. Earl of (Evelyn Baring) Cromer, *Political and Literary Essays, 1908–1913*, Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1969.
 13. Ramón Grosfoguel, 'The Epistemic Decolonial Turn', *Cultural Studies* 21(2), 2007, pp 211–223.
 14. Teun A. van Dijk, 'Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis', *Discourse & Society* 4, 1993, pp 249–283.
 15. Karl Malmqvist, 'Satire, Racist Humour and the Power of (Un)laughter: On the Restrained Nature of Swedish Online Racist Discourse Targeting EU-migrants Begging for Money', *Discourse & Society* 26(6), 2015, pp 733–753.
 16. William A. Callahan, 'Dreaming as a Critical Discourse of National Belonging: China Dream, American Dream and World Dream', *Nations and Nationalism* 23(2), 2017, pp 248–270.
 17. Homi Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse', *Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis* 28(Spring), 1984, pp 125–133.
 18. Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry', p 126.
 19. Deborah Schiffrin, *Approaches to Discourse*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1994, p 20.
 20. Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, *Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method*, London: Sage, 2002.
 21. Norman Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, London: Longman, 1995.
 22. Teun A. van Dijk, 'Critical Discourse Analysis', in *Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, D. Tannen, D. Schiffrin and H. Hamilton (eds), Oxford: Blackwell, 2001, pp 357–372.
 23. van Dijk, 'Critical Discourse Analysis'.
 24. R. Soloveitchik, 'Interview with Judith Butler: Trump Is Emancipating Unbridled Hatred'. *Zeit Online*, 2016. Available at: <http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-10/judith-butler-donald-trump-populism-interview> (accessed 22 February 2017).
 25. Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, III, Richard Delgado, and Kimberle W. Crenshaw, *Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, p 23.
 26. Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*, New York and London: Routledge, 1997, p 16.
 27. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p 19.
 28. Butler, *Excitable Speech*, p 34.
 29. Arthur J. Balfour, Speech by Arthur James Balfour on Consolidated Fund (No. 2) Bill. UK Parliament, 13 June 1910, p18.
 30. Cromer, *Political & Literary Essays*, p 14.
 31. Bernard Lewis, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why so Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West, and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Easily be Mollified', *The Atlantic*, 1990. Available at: <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1990/09/the-roots-of-muslim-rage/304643/> (accessed 31 March 2017), para 12.
 32. Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs* 72(3), 1993, p 25.

33. Homi Bhabha, 'The Other Question ... Homi K Bhabha Reconsiders the Stereotype and Colonial Discourse', *Screen* 24(6), 1983, pp 18–36.
34. Bhabha, 'The Other Question', p 23.
35. Bhabha, 'The Other Question', p 23.
36. Said, *Orientalism*.
37. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*.
38. Staff Time, 'Here's Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech', *Time*, 16 June 2015. Available at: <http://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/> (accessed 26 March 2017).
39. Quijano, 'Coloniality', pp 168–178.
40. B. Morrow, 'Read: Donald Trump Full Immigration Speech Transcript', *Heavy* 31 August 2016. Available at: <http://heavy.com/news/2016/08/read-donald-trump-immigration-speech-august-31-phoenix-arizona-full-transcript-text/> (accessed 26 March 2017).
41. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*.
42. Time Staff, 'Here's Donald Trump's'.
43. Grosfoguel, 'The Epistemic Decolonial', pp 211–223.
44. Quijano, 'Coloniality', pp 168–178.
45. Stephen Whitehead, 'Metrosexuality! Cameron, Brown and the Politics of "New Masculinity"', *Public Policy Research* 14(4), 2007, pp 234–239.
46. Time Staff, 'Here's Donald Trump's'.
47. Said, *Orientalism*.
48. Said, *Orientalism*.
49. Said, *Orientalism*.
50. John Preston, 'Prosthetic White Hyper-Masculinities and "Disaster Education"', *Ethnicities* 10(3), 2010, p 341.
51. Clive Moore, 'Colonial Manhood and Masculinities', *Journal of Australian Studies* 22(56), 1998, p 43.
52. Scott Kiesling, 'Men, Masculinities, and Language', *Language and Linguistics Compass* 1(6), 2007, p 658.
53. Politico Staff, 'Full Text: Donald Trump's Speech on Fighting Terrorism', *Politico*, 15 August 2016b. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-terrorism-speech-227025> (accessed 26 March 2017).
54. Morrow, 'Read: Donald Trump'.
55. Said, *Orientalism*.
56. Said, *Orientalism*.
57. Said, *Orientalism*.
58. Pence Trump, 'Donald J. Trump Addresses Terrorism, Immigration, and National Security', *Trump Pence*, 13 June 2016. Available at: <https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-addresses-terrorism-immigration-and-national-security> (accessed 26 March 2017).
59. Said, *Orientalism*.
60. Said, *Orientalism*.
61. Politico Staff, 'Full Text'.
62. Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry', pp 125–133.
63. Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry', p 128.
64. Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry', p 130.
65. Balfour, 'Speech', p 19.
66. Cromer, *Political & Literary Essays*, p 40.
67. Lewis, 'The Roots', para 36.
68. Huntington, 'The Clash', p 39.
69. James Baldwin, *Nobody Knows My Name: More Notes of a Native Son*, New York: The Dial Press, 1961; James Baldwin, *Collected Essays*, New York: Library of America, 1998.
70. W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: an Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept*, New York: Schocken Books, 1968.

71. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn*.
72. Baldwin, *Collected Essays*.
73. Baldwin, *Nobody Knows*, pp 217–218.
74. Time Staff, ‘Here’s Donald Trump’s’.
75. Kumar, *Islamophobia*.
76. Rudyard Kipling, John Beecroft, and Richard M. Powers, *Kipling: A Selection of His Stories and Poems*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1956, p 444.
77. Kumar, *Islamophobia*.
78. Kumar, *Islamophobia*.
79. Politico Staff, ‘Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Election’, *Politico*, 22 June 2016a. Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/transcript-trump-speech-on-the-stakes-of-the-election-224654> (accessed 26 March 2017).
80. Said, *Orientalism*.
81. CNN, ‘Inaugural Address: Trump’s Full Speech (as prepared for delivery)’, *CNN*, 21 January 2017. Available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/01/20/politics/trump-inaugural-address/> (accessed 26 March 2017).
82. Richard Dyer, *White*, London: Routledge, 1997.
83. Balfour, ‘Speech’, p 42.
84. Cromer, *Political & Literary Essays*, p 24.
85. Lewis, ‘The Roots’, para 45.
86. Huntington, ‘The Clash’, p 22.
87. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, London: Harvester, 1980.
88. Oxford Living Dictionary, ‘Word of the year 2016 is ...’. Available at: <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016> (accessed 22 February 2017).
89. Time Staff, ‘Here’s Donald Trump’s’.
90. Morrow, ‘Read: Donald Trump’.
91. CNN, ‘Inaugural Address’.
92. Mignolo, ‘Delinking’, pp 449–514.
93. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, p 53.
94. Michal Krzyżanowski and Bernhard Forchtner, ‘Theories and Concepts in Critical Discourse Studies: Facing Challenges, Moving Beyond Foundations’, *Discourse & Society* 27(3), 2016, pp 253–261.
95. Jørgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis*.
96. Jørgensen and Phillips, *Discourse Analysis*.
97. Walter D. Mignolo, ‘Geopolitics of Sensing And Knowing: On (De)coloniality, Border Thinking and Epistemic Disobedience’, *Postcolonial Studies* 14(3), 2011, pp 273–283.
98. Gloria E. Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestizo*, San Francisco, CA: Aunt Lute Books, 1987.
99. Mignolo, ‘Geopolitics’, pp 273–283.
100. Quijano, ‘Coloniality’, p 168.
101. Mignolo, ‘Delinking’, pp 449–514; Mignolo, *Geopolitics*, pp 273–283.
102. Quijano, ‘Coloniality’, p 168.
103. Mignolo, ‘Geopolitics’, pp 273–283.
104. Mignolo, ‘Delinking’, p 453.
105. Alexander C. Diener and Joshua Hagen, ‘Theorizing Borders in a “Borderless World”: Globalization, Territory and Identity’, *Geography Compass* 3(3), 2009, pp 1196–1216.
106. Fazila Bhimji, ‘Collaborations and Performative Agency in Refugee Theater in Germany’, *Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies* 14(1), 2016, pp 83–103; A. Nigam, ‘End of Postcolonialism and the Challenge for “Non-European” Thought’, *Critical Encounters*, 2013. Available at: <https://criticalencounters.net/2013/05/19/end-of-postcolonialism-and-the-challenge-for-non-european-thought/>; Leanne Simpson, ‘An Indigenous View on #BlackLivesMatter’, *Yes! Magazine*, 2014. Available at: <http://www.yesmagazine.org/peace-justice/indigenous-view-black-lives-matter-leanne-simpson> (accessed 22 February 2017).

107. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, p 91.

108. Fanon, *Black Skin White Masks*, p 82.

Acknowledgements

Many of the issues addressed in this article initially emerged during the lively discussions took place in the Orientalism, Islamophobia and Postcolonial Transgressions Seminar (fall 2016), during which we followed the U.S. elections as we engaged in postcolonial literature. We thank the students whose ideas and insights resonated with us: Nicholas J. Arseneault, Meghan P. Dawson, Ashley E. Gormley, Paige B. Kynock, Neslihan Önder, Kayla E. Preston, Rachelle F. Skinner, Annie Tremblay. An earlier version of this article was written by Kayla Preston, submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Independent Studies on 'Postcolonial Literature Review' at St. Thomas University (March 2017). The course and the research of this article is based on were conducted under the supervision of Gül Çalışkan. An earlier draft of the article was presented at the 14th Annual Student Research and Ideas Fair (March 2017).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on contributors

Gül Çalışkan is an associate professor at the Department of Sociology, St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada. Her research and teaching concentrate on the broad areas of citizenship (as a social practice) and global social justice within global and transnational sociology. In her research, she engages in postcolonial feminist and critical race literatures and narrative inquiry to examine the complex relations between global processes and everyday realities.

Kayla Preston is an undergraduate student at the Department of Sociology, St. Thomas University, Fredericton, NB, Canada. She is an honours student. Her areas of interest are critical Whiteness studies and postcolonial feminist studies. For her honours thesis, she analyses the discourses of fear and hate in the Facebook posts of pro-White nationalist groups in Canadian society.

ORCID

Gül Çalışkan  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1731-9053>